I agree with your leader that “comparisons between Finland and Ukraine . . . do not stand up to close inspection”.
Indeed I would argue the notion of “Finlandisation”, a term coined by Germans to describe the process whereby a country is induced to favour, or refrain from opposing the interests of a more powerful neighbour, is a misnomer when applied to Ukraine (“Beware comparing Ukraine with Finland”, FT View, February 10).
Finnish nation-building, culminating in the second half of the 20th century, was realised at an extremely high cost and not granted willingly by the former Soviet Union. While Ukraine has common religious, linguistic and ethnic similarities to its dominant neighbour, the strength of Finnish national identity — the adherence of the Finns to Lutheranism and Finnish as a language unrelated to the Slavic language family — gave a very different character to Finland’s task of nation-building.
The postwar policy known as the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line or doctrine, formulated and effectively implemented for 35 years, enabled Finland simultaneously to maintain good relations with the former Soviet Union and prosper as one of the most successful liberal democracies.
The Finns learned that only a realistic foreign policy, based on awareness of the burning national interests and the power of relationships between states, would allow them to realise their national aspirations.
The lack of help from allies at crucial moments of recent history contributed to Finns’ ultra-realistic assessment of their geopolitical situation. It taught them that a small country could not afford to mix emotions into its foreign policy solutions.
Striking evidence of this was the existence of a Soviet military base on the outskirts of Helsinki until 1955. In expanding its western involvement, Finland did its best to dispel ingrained Soviet suspicion that Finland’s economic alignment with the west would not take place to the detriment of the interests of the former Soviet Union.
Despite its dire economic circumstances, Finland prudently declined the US offer of badly needed Marshall Plan aid. While joining the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Free Trade Association, Finland did not join Nato, remaining non-aligned, but guaranteed the most-favoured-nation status to the former Soviet Union and promised the latter the same trade concessions made to its EEC partners.
Thus, one cannot reduce Finland’s belated EU membership in 1995 to the realisation of acquis communautaire — the bloc’s common law, from directives and decisions to regulations and implementing acts.
The former Soviet Union would never have acted as it did if it had not trusted and felt secure with Finland and its leaders, which has never been the case with Ukraine and its leaders.
Armen Martirosyan
Ambassador of Armenia to Lithuania
Vilnius, Lithuania
Letter: Finns prove a small state can live with big neighbour
Pinoy Variant