Columnists Exchange: should Nato become engaged in the war in Ukraine?

From Martin Wolf:

Dear Gideon,

I am slowly and painfully coming to the view that Nato must be prepared to fight.

There is an obvious humanitarian reason for doing so. We know very well how Vladimir Putin fights wars, from Grozny to Aleppo. The assaults on women, children, hospitals, and other civilian targets are not an accident. It is the aim. His modus operandi is to crush the morale of his enemies by showing himself to be remorseless.

There are also more pragmatic reasons for action. In the end, he is surely going to grind the Ukrainians down into a defeat. Remember that Putin regards Stalin as a hero. We all know how many millions Stalin slaughtered. How is it going to look if the west just watches while a country that has bet its entire future on becoming part of our system and attached to our values is annihilated?

Will sanctions deter him from pursuing the war or going even further? No. They are not destroying Putin and his supporters. They are destroying the liberal middle and upper middle classes, which are the most pro-western and anti-Putin parts of the Russian population. Yes, Russia is going to be far poorer. But, given its vast natural resources, its connections to China and the rest of the world and the growing totalitarianism of the regime, it will surely survive as a war economy.

The obvious objection to fighting is that this may lead to nuclear war. I agree: it might, though I doubt whether Putin, a man who sits 20 feet from his closest advisers for fear of Covid, is prepared to die. More important, trying to minimise that risk does not eliminate it.

If Putin wins this war, as I expect, we are likely to have to fight later, on far worse terrain. He will be able to rebuild his forces, perhaps with Chinese help. Then he could go on to the Baltics, which are far less defensible than Ukraine. Will he be deterred by a Nato threat to use nuclear weapons? Probably not, given that we have been so terrified by that threat now. He will surely assume that local conventional superiority is all he will need. Where does that stop? Where and when would we actually fight?

Martin

From Gideon Rachman:

Dear Martin,

I disagree. I think that Nato intervention would turn the tragedy of Ukraine into a global tragedy. Biden has said that it would mean world war three, and he is right. We managed to get through the whole of the cold war without the US and the USSR clashing directly on the battlefield. And that was for a good reason. The leaderships of both countries understood the risks of escalation and nuclear war. The current generation of western leaders should show the same wisdom.

I don’t write any of that with pleasure. The events in Ukraine are appalling. Putin’s references to nuclear weapons are clearly a form of blackmail.

You suggest that he is probably bluffing. Maybe. But I am not prepared to take that risk. Russian military doctrine envisages the first use of tactical nuclear weapons, if Russia is losing a conventional war and the existence of the state is deemed to be at risk. I think Putin and those around him would see defeat by Nato as meeting that test. They would also know that they, personally, would have no future if Russia lost a war to Nato. Why not, in those circumstances, gamble on the use of nuclear weapons as a shock tactic?

There are those who believe that there could be such a thing as a limited nuclear war — in which only battlefield weapons are used. But once the post-1945 taboo on the use of nuclear weapons is broken, things could escalate fast. Even a conventional war between Russia and Nato would be exceptionally dangerous. What does victory look like? The surrender of all Russian forces? The occupation of Moscow? These do not seem like plausible scenarios.

Finally, you suggest that “if Putin wins this war, we are likely to have to fight later”. That is a big if. The Russians are taking heavy losses and have failed to achieve any of their major strategic objectives. I struggle to see how they will now conquer Ukraine — let alone move on to the Baltic states or Poland. If that happened, we really would be in world war three. But let us do our utmost to avoid that conflict, rather than accelerate towards it.

Gideon

From MW:

Dear Gideon,

I understand and respect your concerns. But they are not in my view decisive. The reasons you give for not fighting now are essentially the reasons any reasonable person would give for not fighting for Estonia or Latvia or Lithuania or Poland or indeed anywhere else.

If a third world war is such a crippling worry, how can the premise of Nato be credible? Its effectiveness has always depended on the belief that Nato is indeed prepared to run the risk of nuclear war.

The question is whether the obliteration of Ukraine, which has not yet happened, but may yet occur, should be a casus belli. The argument against it is that Nato (the Americans, of course) made the suggestion that Ukraine might become a Nato member in certain circumstances, but not yet. So formally Nato has no commitment to Ukraine’s defence.

However, the decision to suggest that Ukraine might become a member was itself a form of commitment. More importantly, it increased the likelihood of pre-emptive action by Putin, which has now happened. So, we definitely have some moral responsibility for his invasion.

We also have a moral responsibility for preventing the annihilation of a people and a country that simply wished to be modern Europeans. That is, to live as free men and women in a democratic country, not as serfs to the gangsters who rule the Kremlin.

I am not saying that we have to intervene militarily today. I would be satisfied if our leaders clearly warned Putin that we are not going to permit the annihilation of the people of Ukraine or of their aspirations to be free of the Kremlin’s yoke. In doing even this, we will run a risk. But we are going to run a risk in dealing with Putin’s regime so long as it exists, unless we are always prepared to give him whatever he wants whenever he asks. We should stiffen our spines now. Next time, when it comes, could prove vastly more difficult.

Martin

From GR:

Dear Martin,

You are right to insist on the human and moral dimensions of this crisis. But I still disagree with your conclusions. Let me focus on three points: morality, nuclear deterrence and the importance of clarity.

You say we have a moral obligation to fight for Ukraine. But I would question the morality of any decision that significantly increases the likelihood of nuclear war.

You suggest that if we are unwilling to run the risk of nuclear war over Ukraine, the credibility of Nato’s nuclear deterrence is undermined — for when would we ever use nuclear weapons? The answer to that has always been that Nato will fight if and when a Nato nation is attacked. That is when the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons would arise. Not before. Of course, the Russians might question whether we really have the will to use those weapons. But the possibility that they will be used — combined with Nato’s mutual defence guarantee — is central to western deterrence and remains so.

Finally, you suggest we should tell Putin that we will not permit the annihilation of Ukraine. I would steer clear of vague threats and exhortations. What do we mean by “not permit”; what do we mean by “annihilation”? We need to be very clear about what we would do — and under what circumstances; otherwise we simply risk losing credibility. It is the clarity of Nato’s Article Five commitment that gives it force.

But let’s end on a point of agreement. We do indeed need to “stiffen our spines”. More military spending; more troops to central Europe; more sanctions on Russia; and Nato membership for Finland and Sweden, if they want it. But military intervention in Ukraine: I think not.

Gideon



Columnists Exchange: should Nato become engaged in the war in Ukraine?
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